
An Axiomatic Theory of Provably-Fair Welfare-Centric Machine Learning

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Assumptions and axioms are shown in pastel blue, and properties in pastel red.

Estimating Malfare Values

- 1. Assuming only *monotonicity*:
- Suppose $\forall \omega \in \Omega : \hat{\mathcal{S}}(\omega) \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}(\omega) \leq \mathcal{S}(\omega) \leq \hat{\mathcal{S}}(\omega) + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}(\omega)$. Then

$$\mathrm{M}_p(oldsymbol{0}ee(\hat{\mathcal{S}}-oldsymbol{arepsilon});oldsymbol{w}) \leq \mathrm{M}_p(\mathcal{S};oldsymbol{w}) \leq \mathrm{M}_p(\hat{\mathcal{S}}+oldsymbol{arepsilon};oldsymbol{w}) \;\;,$$

where $\boldsymbol{a} \vee \boldsymbol{b}$ denotes the (elementwise) maximum.

2. Suppose range r. Then with probability at least $1 - \delta$ over choice of x:

$$\left| \mathrm{M}_p(\mathcal{S}; \boldsymbol{w}) - \mathrm{M}_p(\hat{\mathcal{S}}; \boldsymbol{w}) \right| \leq r \sqrt{\frac{\ln \frac{2g}{\delta}}{2m}}$$

3. Suppose range r and variances $\mathbb{V}_{\mathcal{D}_i}[\ell]$. With probability at least $1 - \delta$:

$$\left| \mathrm{M}_p(\mathcal{S}; \boldsymbol{w}) - \mathrm{M}_p(\hat{\mathcal{S}}; \boldsymbol{w}) \right| \leq rac{r \ln rac{2g}{\delta}}{3m} + \max_{i \in 1, ..., g} \sqrt{rac{2 \, \mathbb{V}_{\mathcal{D}_i}[\ell] \ln rac{2g}{\delta}}{m}} \; .$$

2 & 3 hold for all fair malfare functions $(p \ge 1)$, but not all welfare functions.

Empirical Malfare Minimization

Empirical risk and risk of hypothesis h given loss ℓ :

$$\hat{\mathbf{R}}(h;\ell,\boldsymbol{z}) \doteq \hat{\mathbb{E}}_{(x,y)\in\boldsymbol{z}} \big[\ell(y,h(x)) \big] \quad \& \quad \mathbf{R}(h;\ell,\mathcal{D}) \doteq \mathbb{E}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}} \big[\ell(y,h(x)) \big] \quad .$$

We define *empirical malfare minimization* (EMM), given $\mathcal{M}(\cdot; \boldsymbol{w})$, $\mathcal{D}_{1:g}$, and $\boldsymbol{z}_{1:g}$, with proxy and ideal models

$$\hat{h} \doteq \underset{h \in \mathcal{H}}{\operatorname{argmin}} \operatorname{M} \left(i \mapsto \hat{\mathrm{R}}(h; \ell, \boldsymbol{z}_i); \boldsymbol{w} \right) \quad \& \quad h^* \doteq \underset{h \in \mathcal{H}}{\operatorname{argmin}} \operatorname{M} \left(i \mapsto \mathrm{R}(h; \ell, \mathcal{D}_i); \boldsymbol{w} \right) \;.$$


Under what conditions is \hat{h} a good proxy for h^* ?

Theorem 1 (Generalization Guarantees for Malfare Estimation). Suppose fair power-mean malfare $\Lambda_p(\cdot; \cdot)$ (i.e., $p \geq 1$), probability vector $\boldsymbol{w} \in \mathbb{R}^g_+$, loss function $\ell : (\mathcal{Y} \times \mathcal{Y}) \to [0, r]$, samples $\boldsymbol{z}_i \sim \mathcal{D}_i^m$, and hypothesis class $\mathcal{H} \subseteq \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$. Then with probability at least $1 - \delta$ over choice of \boldsymbol{z} ,

$$\sup_{h \in \mathcal{H}} \left| \mathcal{M}_p(i \mapsto \mathcal{R}(h; \ell, \mathcal{D}_i); \boldsymbol{w}) - \mathcal{M}_p(i \mapsto \hat{\mathcal{R}}(h; \ell, \boldsymbol{z}_i); \boldsymbol{w}) \right|$$
$$\leq \mathcal{M}_p\left(i \mapsto 2\hat{\boldsymbol{\mathfrak{X}}}_m(\ell \circ \mathcal{H}, \boldsymbol{z}_i) + 3r\sqrt{\frac{\ln \frac{g}{\delta}}{2m}}; \boldsymbol{w}\right) .$$

Experiment

- Training *linear models* on *adult* (census data) dataset
 - Support vector machine (hinge loss)
 - Logistic regression (cross entropy loss)
 - Losses weighted by group-conditional label frequencies
- Predict whether income is \leq or > 50,000 per annum
- Minimize malfare over 5 ethnic groups



- Higher $p \implies$ fairer model, closer to *egalitarianism*
- p = 1 favors *large groups* (at the expense of minorities)
 - This is the default, assuming minority groups are even considered during training!
 - Dire need for fairness-sensitive learning objectives

Fair PAC Learning

Definition 2 (Fair-PAC (FPAC) Learnability). Suppose hypothesis class sequence $\mathcal{H}_1 \subseteq \mathcal{H}_2 \subseteq \cdots \subseteq \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$, and loss function $\ell : \mathcal{Y} \times \mathcal{Y} \to \mathbb{R}_{0+}$.

We say \mathcal{H} is fair PAC-learnable w.r.t. loss function ℓ if \exists a (randomized) algorithm \mathcal{A} , such that for all:

- 1. sequence indices d;
- 4. malfares M satisfying axioms 1-7 & 9;
- 2. g instance distributions $\mathcal{D}_{1:g}$; 3. probability vectors $\boldsymbol{w} \in \mathbb{R}^{g}_{+}$;
- 5. additive appx. errors $\varepsilon > 0$; and 6. failure probabilities $\delta \in (0, 1)$;

 \mathcal{A} can identify a hypothesis $\hat{h} \in \mathcal{H}$, i.e., $\hat{h} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathcal{D}_{1:g}, \boldsymbol{w}, \mathcal{M}, \varepsilon, \delta, d)$, such that


1. there exists some sample complexity function $m(\varepsilon, \delta, d, g) : (\mathbb{R}_+ \times (0, 1) \times \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N}) \to \mathbb{N}$ s.t. $\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{D}_{1:g}, \boldsymbol{w}, \mathcal{M}, \varepsilon, \delta, d)$ consumes no more than $m(\varepsilon, \delta, d, g)$ samples (finite sample complexity); and

2. with probability at least $1 - \delta$ (over randomness of \mathcal{A}), \hat{h} obeys

$$\mathbf{M}\left(i \mapsto \mathbf{R}(\hat{h}; \ell, \mathcal{D}_i); \boldsymbol{w}\right) \leq \inf_{h^* \in \mathcal{H}} \mathbf{M}\left(i \mapsto \mathbf{R}(h^*; \ell, \mathcal{D}_i); \boldsymbol{w}\right) + \varepsilon .$$

The class of such fair-learning problems is FPAC.

Finally, if for all d, the space of \mathcal{D} is restricted such that $\exists h \in \mathcal{H}_d$ s.t. $\max_{i \in 1, \dots, q} \mathbb{R}(h; \ell, \mathcal{D}_i) = 0$, then (\mathcal{H}, ℓ) is realizable-FPAC-learnable.



Implications between membership in PAC and FPAC classes. In particular, for arbitrary fixed ℓ , implication denotes *implication of membership* of some \mathcal{H} (i.e., containment). Dashed implication arrows hold conditionally on ℓ .

When the no-free-lunch assumption on ℓ holds, the hierarchy collapses, and in general, under realizability, some classes are known to coincide.